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background
Much research has shown that effortful acts of self-control 
temporarily impair its subsequent exertion. The aim of our 
experiment was to examine whether this effect, called ego 
depletion, is influenced by application of certain strategies 
that help people to overcome impulses. Another purpose of 
our research was to investigate the role of self-control as 
a trait in this area. We focused on amusement regulation 
because of its importance in everyday life.
participants and procedure
Participants (N  =  90) completed the Self-Control Scale 
(NAS-50) and were then asked to rate humorous cartoons 
(Task 1) while inducing the following self-regulatory strat-
egies suggested by the instructions: cognitive change, 
response inhibition, or none (between-subjects manipula-
tion). Subsequently, participants performed the Stop Sig-
nal Task (Task 2).
results
The results indicate that the depletion effect is absent un-
less trait self-control is included in the analysis. We ob-
served the interaction between the self-control trait and 
the effectiveness of the adopted self-regulatory strategy. 
Participants with poor self-control did not differ in their 
performance in Task 2, regardless of the adopted strategy. 
With the increase in the self-control trait, we observed dif-
ferences in Task 2 that indicated that the cognitive change 
strategy guarded against depletion in participants with 
a  medium level of self-control. Participants with a  high 
self-control trait level obtained better scores in both reg-
ulatory groups, compared to the condition without any 
strategy.
conclusions
We discuss these findings in terms of the competing expla-
nations of the ‘ego depletion’ effect, as well as in terms of 
the trait versus state approach to self-control.
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Background
Self-control is the ability of humans to control 
thoughts, emotions and behaviour when a  conflict 
between action tendencies occurs. The decision con-
cerning the actual course of behaviour is tough: one 
action usually requires effort but leads to the fulfil-
ment of an important goal, whereas the other corre-
sponds to a desire that threatens this goal’s achieve-
ment, yet gives an immediate reward (Duckworth 
& Gross, 2014). Postponing gratification, inhibiting 
automatic response, or overriding innate impulses 
in the face of a  future reward are a  few examples 
of many self-control manifestations. Despite the fact 
that self-control serves people to maintain success in 
life (Moffit et al., 2011), most of us sometimes fail to 
exert control and succumb to the tendency of behav-
ing in a more automatic or impulsive manner. 
Every person pursues multiple goals simultane-
ously; therefore, he/she has to deal with many be-
havioural tendencies. Self-control requires constant 
integration of these tendencies with regard to pos-
sible disturbing stimuli that occur on an everyday ba-
sis. The effectiveness of this integration differs across 
individuals and hence constitutes an important per-
sonal trait. The self-control trait is known to be rela-
tively stable across many situations (de Ridder, Lens-
velt-Mulders, Finkenauer, Stok, & Baumeister, 2012) 
and can be trained, at least in some cases (Muraven, 
Baumeister, & Tice, 1999).
People differ from each other with respect to their 
level of self-control (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 
2004). Some people are prone to being distracted by 
temptations and are more willing to act on them, 
while others are more likely to pursue their goals in 
a quite placid way regardless of the desires that arise. 
Therefore, self-control may be seen as a  relatively 
permanent trait of personality (de Ridder et al., 2012). 
Individuals with a high level of self-control are more 
likely to experience positive life outcomes compared 
to those with a low level of self-control (Moffit et al., 
2011). The self-control trait develops in early child-
hood and affects later developmental stages. For ex-
ample, children who performed poorly on a  delay 
of gratification task had more difficulties in school 
10 years later than their peers who were able to wait 
for the reward for a longer period of time (Mischel, 
Shoda, &  Peake, 1988). Moreover, Duckworth and 
Seligman (2005) have shown that self-discipline 
outclasses intellectual abilities in terms of predict-
ing academic success. Additionally, there is empiri-
cal evidence that dispositional self-control facilitates 
outcomes in five behavioural domains pinpointed 
by Tagney and her colleagues (2004): achievements, 
impulse control, adjustment, interpersonal relation-
ships, and moral emotions. 
In addition to the trait approach to self-control, 
a parallel perspective has developed which treats self-
control in terms of a state (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007). 
Self-control fluctuates at the intra-personal level ac-
cording to the situational context (e.g., the presence 
of others, the intensity of desired stimuli, etc.) and the 
transient psychophysiological condition (e.g., being 
hungry). The self-control state has been thoroughly 
investigated since Baumeister and his colleagues 
proposed an ‘ego depletion’ model of self-control 
(Baumeister &  Vohs, 2007; Muraven &  Baumeister, 
2000). Baumeister and Heatherton (1996) noticed that 
efforts in self-control in one task partially indispose 
exertion of self-control in the following task. This 
sequential task paradigm has lent support to the im-
plication that self-control depends on some kind of 
mental energy that has properties resembling fuel in 
a car: it is limited and enables self-control to operate. 
On the one hand, the ego depletion effect as such was 
thought to be well established (Hagger, Wood, Stiff, 
&  Chatzisarantis, 2010; Schmeichel, 2007, but see: 
Hagger et al., 2016); on the other hand, the explana-
tion proposed by the authors of its mental capacity 
origins are now discussed (Job, Dweck, &  Walton, 
2010; Clarkson, Hirt, Jia, & Alexander, 2010; Inzlicht 
& Schmeichel, 2012; Inzlicht, Schmeichel, & Macrae, 
2014). The alternative explanations of the ego-deple-
tion effect do not appeal to limited inner resources 
due to the important limitations of Baumeister’s 
theory. Firstly, glucose, the biological substrate of 
the brain’s energy, was claimed to be an implausible 
physiological basis of the ego-depletion effect (for 
discussion on this topic see: Kurzban, 2010; Beedie 
&  Lane, 2012; Kurzban, Duckworth, Kable, &  My-
ers, 2013). Secondly, it is relatively easy to reduce 
the effect by, for example, manipulating participants’ 
beliefs about willpower without any changes in the 
amount of mental effort they have to exert (Job et al., 
2010). To address these issues, Inzlicht and his co-
workers proposed a  motivational explanation for 
this phenomenon that is referred to as the shifting 
priorities model (Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012; Inzlicht 
et al., 2014). The authors allege that the basis of ego 
depletion can be found in a shift in motivation and 
attention. Specifically, as engaging in self-control is 
unpleasant (mostly because it is effortful), exerting 
self-control reduces further motivation for tasks that 
are executed with a sense of duty and, at the same 
time, increases motivation to perform behaviours 
connected with personally meaningful or entertain-
ing goals. According to the model, these shifts in mo-
tivation are strongly related to shifts in attention: it 
either becomes reduced to cues signalling a need for 
control, or it increases for cues signalling immedi-
ate reward. Therefore, participants who experience 
effort during one task feel more justified to not make 
an effort during a second task. The main statement of 
the shifting priorities model is that, much like fatigue 
(Hockey, 2011), the ego-depletion effect is caused by 
unwillingness instead of a real physiological incapa-
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bility. We believe that the processual model (Gross, 
2002; Duckworth, Gendler, & Gross, 2014) may con-
tribute to understanding the mechanisms that hide 
underneath the ego depletion effect and tells us a lit-
tle bit more about the relation between the self-con-
trol state and the self-control trait.
Given the above, it becomes clear that the self-
control trait is a very important personality disposi-
tion and should be taken into account as a covari-
ant in research that aims to scrutinize self-control 
behaviour in diverse domains. Yet, its relationship 
with short-term situational changes has been poorly 
investigated so far. It may be assumed that disposi-
tional self-control should guard against the negative 
influence of situational factors such as contact with 
a temptation or inner depletion (e.g. caused by pre-
vious inhibition of impulses). However, evidence in 
this area is scarce and even counterintuitive (Imhoff, 
Schmidt, & Gerstenberg, 2014). The main aim of the 
present study was to investigate the relationship be-
tween the self-control state and the self-control trait 
in the context of emotional regulation based on met-
acognitive strategies. We explore the consequences 
of implementing different strategies of amusement 
regulation for the subsequent capability to halt an 
already prepared reaction in order to further clarify 
the role that self-control trait plays in the observed 
effect. Regulation of emotions is widely considered 
to be a  part of self-control (Inzlicht, Bartholow, 
& Hirsh, 2015; Tangney et al., 2004). The processual 
model of emotional regulation proposed by Gross 
(1998, 2002) and developed by Duckworth, Gendler 
and Gross (2014, 2016) propounds that both emotion-
al regulation and self-control depend on metacogni-
tive strategies that people implement in their every-
day lives to counteract impulsive behaviour. These 
strategies are organized into five stages: (1) selection 
of situation, (2) modification of situation, (3) atten-
tional deployment, (4) cognitive change, and (5) re-
sponse modulation (Duckworth et al., 2014). 
Amusement is certainly one of the most pleasant 
feelings people encounter in everyday life. Amuse-
ment, as well as other feelings connected with hu-
mour, occupies a special place in human social inter-
actions (Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2013). Humour 
enhances cooperation, promotes binding, and helps 
people to ‘break the ice’ (Weisfeld, 1993). It is also 
considered as a  component in maintaining health 
(Martin, 2001). Nevertheless, there are circumstanc-
es under which people should not feel – or at least 
should not express – their amusement. Those situa-
tions include lectures, business meetings, and funer-
als, to name just a  few. Emotion regulation studies 
usually focus on negative feelings, probably due to 
their possibly devastating influence on human be-
haviour and well-being. We believe that regulation 
of positive feelings is also a  socially important is-
sue. According to the processual model, the earlier 
a person implements a  strategy, the more effective 
their emotion or behaviour management (Gross, 
2002; Duckworth et  al., 2014, 2016); however, hu-
morous situations are usually unexpected. There-
fore, while down-regulating their amusement, peo-
ple depend on the later stage strategies proposed 
by the processual model: cognitive change, which 
is often equated with reappraisal; and response 
modulation, which takes the form of inhibition of 
the emotional response. Cognitive change consists 
in altering the way a situation is mentally construed 
so as to decrease its emotional impact, while inhi-
bition amounts to suppression of outward signs of 
feelings (Gross, 2002). Cognitive change and inhibi-
tion are related to different brain activations (e.g., 
Vrtička, Sander, &  Vuilleumier, 2011), and usually 
the former appears to be more effective than the lat-
ter (Gross, 2002; Ochsner & Gross, 2005). The aim of 
this research is to examine whether and how trait 
self-control and metacognitive strategies interact 
and to scrutinize their relation to possible short-
term consequences of overcoming amusement (i.e., 
ego depletion).
The predictions that motivated our study are as 
follows. If the resource model (Baumeister & Vohs, 
2007) is valid, amusement regulation should impair 
subsequent acts of self-control, regardless of the 
adopted strategy. Both cognitive change and modu-
lation involve mental effort and activate large brain 
structures, mostly the prefrontal cortex (PFC; Gol-
din, McRae, Ramel, & Gross, 2008; Korb, Grandjean, 
Samson, Delplanque, & Scherer, 2012; Vrtička et al., 
2011), and therefore both these strategies depend 
on the brain’s energy resources. However, cognitive 
change consists in cognitive manipulation that en-
tails goal shifting and attention deployment; rather 
than focusing on the undesirable response, one has 
to focus on cognitive aspects of the situation (Inzli-
cht et al., 2014; Korb et al., 2012). If the motivational 
stance is valid (e.g., Inzlicht &  Schmeichel, 2012), 
cognitive change should have a smaller negative im-
pact than response inhibition for subsequent acts of 
self-control. Both cognitive change and inhibition 
should decrease the funniness of humorous stimuli; 
yet, unlike inhibition, cognitive change should be 
sufficient to foil self-regulatory failure. Addition-
ally, we intended to determine whether self-control 
understood as a personal trait (Tangney et al., 2004; 
Moffit et al., 2011) would show any moderating in-
fluence on the predicted effects. Some people are 
more prone to ceasing their self-control effort than 
others. It has been proposed that the self-control 
trait may be linked more to adaptive customs and 
habits than to resisting single temptations (de Rid-
der et  al., 2012). On that account, we assume that 
the self-control trait should reveal its influence espe-
cially under conditions in which the default strategy 
is poor (i.e., inhibition). 
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ParticiPants and Procedure
ParticiPants
Forty-seven females and 43 males (N = 90) partici-
pated in exchange for 20 PLN (≈ 5 €). Due to missing 
information in the questionnaires, five participants 
were excluded from further analyses, leaving a total 
of 85 (46 females), age 21-35 (M = 23.26, SD = 2.26). 
Participants were volunteers recruited by an Inter-
net advertisement. The candidates were told that the 
purpose of the study was to investigate different as-
pects of perception. Participants were randomly as-
signed to three groups, according to the experimen-
tal manipulation described in the Procedure section.
tests and materials
Cartoons. We used 60 supposedly funny cartoons. 
They were carefully chosen from 200 humorous pic-
tures found on the web. These 200 cartoons were sub-
jected to the pilot study, in which the participants 
(N = 30) were asked to rate them on the basis of being 
more or less funny. All cartoons were ranked accord-
ing to the assessed humorous value; we chose the top 
60 pictures as stimuli in this experiment.
Stop signal task. Participants performed the stop 
signal task (Logan, 1994) modified by Senderecka 
and her co-workers (Senderecka, Grabowska, Szew-
czyk, Gerc, & Chmylak, 2012). Pictures of an airplane 
heading left or right served as the visual stimuli in 
this version of the SST. Participants were asked to 
press the left or right arrow keys according to the 
direction of the plane. They were instructed to be as 
fast and correct as possible. These go stimuli were 
randomly presented one at a  time, each with 50% 
probability. On 25% of trials, an auditory stop sig-
nal was presented over headphones; it alerted par-
ticipants to inhibit their response to the primary go 
stimulus, regardless of the direction of the plane. 
After successful inhibition, the interval between 
the go and stop stimuli became 50 ms longer; after 
unsuccessful inhibition the interval became 50 ms 
shorter (min. 150 ms, max. 400 ms). At the start of 
the experiment the stop-signal delay was 150 ms. 
The SSRT (stop signal reaction time) was calculated 
by subtracting the critical 50% stop-signal delay la-
tency from the mean primary go task reaction time, 
which was estimated from correct no-signal trials. 
The shorter the SSRT, the better the ability to inhibit 
the unnecessary response.
NAS-50 self-control questionnaire. For self-control 
assessment, we used the NAS-50 questionnaire de-
veloped by Nęcka et  al. (2016). It measures general 
trait self-control and its five components, represent-
ed by the following subscales: Initiative and Persist-
ence, Proactive Control, Switching and Flexibility, 
Goal Maintenance, and Inhibition and Adjournment. 
The validation study, run with the participation 
of 930 people, revealed good internal consistency 
of this questionnaire (Cronbach’s α  =  .86), as well 
as a high level of stability in the test-retest evalua-
tion (intraclass correlation coefficient, ICC  =  .94). 
Moreover, NAS-50 showed positive correlations with 
other measures of self-control, including Tangney, 
Baumeister and Boone’s Self-Control Scale (r =  .76, 
p < .001; Tangney et al., 2004), and a lack of correla-
tion with intelligence test scores.
Procedure
Sequence of events. Participants entered the com-
puter lab in groups (from 3 to 6 persons). The ex-
perimenter was always present in the lab during the 
whole procedure. In the first part of the experiment, 
participants completed two questionnaires: the 
UWIST Mood Adjective Checklist (UMACL; Mat-
thews, Jones, & Chamberlain, 1990) and NAS-50. In 
the second part of the procedure, participants were 
presented with 60 humorous pictures that appeared 
on the screen one by one (Task 1). Their task was 
to rate each cartoon by pressing appropriate keys. 
Possible ratings were as follows: 1 – not funny at all, 
2 – a bit funny, 3 – funny, 4 – very funny. Every sin-
gle cartoon was presented immediately after a par-
ticipant had rated the previous one. At the end of 
the experiment, all participants performed the Stop 
Signal Task (Task 2).
Manipulation. Participants were randomly as-
signed to one of three emotion regulation conditions: 
inhibition, cognitive change, and control. In the in-
hibition condition, the participants (N  =  29) were 
instructed to suppress their amusement and laugh-
ter. In order to make them inhibit amusement, we 
presented them with the following instruction: “The 
aim of the experiment is to check how suppression 
of amusement influences other cognitive abilities. 
Therefore, you are asked to suppress your amuse-
ment while looking at the pictures on the screen. 
You should suppress external symptoms of amuse-
ment (facial expressions, laughter, body movements) 
as well as inner amusement”. In the cognitive change 
condition, participants (N  =  27) were instructed to 
play the role of a reviewer, according to the follow-
ing instruction: “The aim of the experiment is to 
check how critical analysis influences other cogni-
tive abilities. Therefore, you are asked to try to im-
personate an art critic. You should think about the 
good and bad features of each picture presented on 
the screen, considering different values such as aes-
thetics, humour, ethics, etc.” The main purpose of the 
instruction was to implement a strategy that would 
help participants to have a serious attitude towards 
the presented pictures (role of art critic) and thus en-
Self-control trait and self-control state
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able them to appraise other factors, rather than only 
the humorous value of the pictures. In the control 
condition, participants (N  =  29) were told just the 
following: “The aim of the experiment is to check 
how watching some less or more humorous pictures 
influences other cognitive abilities”. 
results
amusement regulation
Our first goal was to assess whether the amusement 
regulation strategy, or lack thereof, affected the car-
toon ratings. The dependent variable (DV) was calcu-
lated as the sum of the ratings of all pictures present-
ed to every participant. A one-way ANOVA revealed 
significant differences between groups, presented in 
Table 1, upper row (F(2,82) = 8.53, p < .001, h2 = 0.17). 
Tukey’s post hoc tests showed that inhibition 
(p < .001) and cognitive change (p = .009) decreased 
the ratings of humorous pictures, in comparison to 
the control group. There were no significant differ-
ences between the inhibition and cognitive change 
conditions. We did not find any significant relations 
between the mood of the participants (measured by 
UMACL) and the ratings of the humorous pictures.
ego dePletion
Next, we looked at the ego-depletion effect. We hy-
pothesized that using the modulation strategy (inhi-
bition) during Task 1 would cause the depletion ef-
fect in Task 2, whereas the cognitive change strategy 
would not. This hypothesis was tested by perform-
ance in the Stop Signal Task and SSRT as its basic 
dependent variable. This DV was log transformed 
in order to normalize its distribution. We expected 
that participants in the cognitive change and control 
group would demonstrate better performance (short-
er SSRT) than participants in the inhibition group. 
This hypothesis was not proven (see: Table 1, lower 
row). The one-way ANOVA on mean SSRT revealed 
significant differences between groups (F(2,82) = 3.40, 
p =  .038, h2 = 0.08). Tukey’s post hoc tests revealed 
that despite the fact that SSRT scores in the inhibi-
tion group (M = 232.93, SD = 42.07) were worse than 
those in the cognitive change group (M  =  212.26, 
SD = 29.44), this difference did not reach the level of 
significance (p  =  .089). Unexpectedly, the post-hoc 
analysis showed significant differences between the 
cognitive change and the control group (p = .048), and 
no significant differences between the control and 
the inhibition group. Thus, the control group subjects 
obtained unpredictably poor scores in SST although 
they were not required to regulate amusement.
the moderating influence  
of the self-control trait  
on the self-control state
To test our hypotheses regarding the self-control trait, 
we ran moderation analyses with the Process macro 
(version 2.16.3) for SPSS. SSRT was the dependent 
variable and trait self-control (SCT) was the modera-
tor. To keep SCT as a  continuous variable, we used 
a method proposed by Hayes and Montoya (2017) that 
allows an interaction with a multi-categorical variable 
to be tested and probed (here: the experimental con-
dition) in linear regression analysis. We performed 
Helmert coding. Therefore, D
1
 and D
2
 were created 
and regressed on SSRT (log-transformed), where b
1
 
estimates the mean difference in SSRT between the 
control group and the unweighted mean of the means 
for the Inhibition and cognitive change groups; b
2
 es-
timates the difference between the means of the In-
hibition group and the cognitive change group. The 
tested model was significant R² =  .19, F(5,79)
 
= 3.64, 
p = .005. The results revealed a significant interaction 
between D
1
 and SCT (b = –0.01, SE = 0.001, t = –2.26, 
p = .026), yet ∆R did not reach the level of significance 
(p = .074). We looked at the conditional effect of group 
condition (D
1
 and D
2
) on SSRT at the specific values 
of SCT (moderator): M and ±1 SD. The results showed 
that there is no influence of the experimental condi-
tion (for both D
1
 and D
2
) at the low level of the mod-
erator (–1 SD). At the mean level of the moderator, 
the difference between the mean in the control group 
and the mean of the means in both experimental 
groups (D
1
) was insignificant; however, the difference 
between the Inhibition and Cognitive change condi-
tion (D
2
) had a significant influence on DV (b2 = –0.04, 
SE = 0.02, t = –2.16, p =  .033). A test of equality of 
conditional means at the mean value of the modera-
tor revealed ∆R = .07, F(2,79)
 
= 3.49, p = .035. At a high 
value of the moderator (+1 SD), D
1
 had a significant 
influence on DV (b
1 
=  –0.06, SE  =  0.02, t  =  –2.60, 
p =  .011). A test of equality of conditional means at 
the mean value of the moderator revealed ∆R = 0.09, 
F(2,79)
 
= 4.21, p = .018, whereas D
2
 did not have a sig-
nificant influence on DV.
Table 1
Total scores of funniness and mean SSRT in three 
groups
Control Inhibition Cognitive 
change
Funniness 
scores
148.31 121.55 127.33
SSRT (ms) 234.62 232.93 212.26
Note. SSRT is stop signal reaction time.
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To illustrate the model (Figure 1), we chose values 
of the moderator (SCT) corresponding to the sam-
ple mean (M  =  158.84) and one standard deviation 
(SD = 14.82) above the mean (176.65) and below the 
mean (144.02), as suggested by Hayes and Montoya 
(2017). Our question is whether the effect of condi-
tion on SSRT varies depending on SCT. Therefore, 
our interest is in the gap between the lines at the 
presented values of SCT on the horizontal axis, not 
in the different slopes of the lines. The gap between 
the lines conditioned at a specific value of SCT indi-
cates the presence or absence of differences in SSRT 
as a  result of adopting different strategies of emo-
tional regulation. As we can see, at the low level of 
SCT (~144) the differences are not significant. At the 
medium level of SCT (~158), there is a  significant 
difference between inhibition and cognitive change 
groups (p = .035). On one hand, at the high level of 
SCT (~177) there is a significant difference between 
the unweighted mean of the Inhibition and cognitive 
change groups and the control group (p =  .011); on 
the other hand, no differences between the inhibition 
and cognitive change groups were significant at this 
level of the trait of self-control.
discussion
We presented participants with funny cartoons 
(Task  1) and asked them either to play the role of 
an art critic (cognitive change strategy) or just to ab-
stain from laughter and amusement (inhibition strat-
egy). The control group subjects were instructed to 
just enjoy the cartoons (spontaneous condition, Korb 
et al., 2012). We found that both strategies lowered 
the funniness of the cartoons. We also found that the 
ego-depletion effect occurred in Task 2 among par-
ticipants with low self-control as a trait in the inhibi-
tion group. Cognitive change did not produce such 
a depleting effect, regardless of the participants’ level 
of the self-control trait. 
Numerous studies using the sequential task par-
adigm have shown detrimental effects of emotion 
regulation on the efficacy of subsequently exerted 
cognitive control (e.g., Gray, 2001; Johns, Inzlicht, 
&  Schmader, 2008; Hofmann, Rauch, &  Gawronski, 
2007; Schmeichel, Caskey, & Hicks, 2015). These ef-
fects have not yet been directly checked for amuse-
ment and humour, so the present study fills this gap 
using humorous stimuli in Task 1. The results con-
firmed the prediction that implementing regulation 
strategies such as suppression (inhibition) or cogni-
tive change reduces ratings of humorous stimuli. 
This result is in line with previous findings on the 
influence of emotional regulation on reducing the 
subjective feeling of positive emotions (Gross, 2002; 
Korb et al., 2012). Notably, there were no significant 
differences between ratings in the suppression and 
cognitive change conditions, which may suggest that 
cognitive change is not a superior strategy to modula-
tion. On the other hand, cognitive change may still be 
a better strategy in terms of the amount of required 
effort and its suitability for sustaining goal-oriented 
motivation (Milyavskaya, Inzlicht, Hope, & Koestner, 
2015; Gergelyfi, Jacob, Olivier, & Zénon, 2015). In that 
case, the lack of differences between groups should 
not be surprising, though we should expect differenc-
es in subsequent control-demanding tasks (Task 2).
This prediction has not been confirmed directly 
since participants who applied the cognitive change 
strategy did not demonstrate better control in the 
SST than the inhibition group. As a matter of fact, 
this difference occurred but did not reach the level 
of statistical significance (p =  .089). This result is in 
line with recent reports that the ego-depletion effect 
size is small or close to zero (Carter & McCullough, 
2014; Hagger et al., 2016). However, participants from 
the control group (spontaneous condition) obtained 
poor results in the SST (significantly worse than par-
ticipants from the cognitive change group), although 
they were not supposed to control anything in Task 1. 
These findings may be surprising, as long as we do 
not consider the possibility that participants in the 
Figure 1. Stop signal reaction time (SSRT) by con-
dition, depending on the trait self-control.
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control group might have modulated their emotions 
similarly to participants in the inhibition group, even 
though they were not asked to do so. A psychological 
experiment feels like an official situation; therefore 
it can influence participants’ behaviour without the 
researcher’s intention (Nichols & Maner, 2008). Thus, 
participants in the control group might have tried to 
silently inhibit their amusement so as not to inter-
rupt others or attract the experimenter’s attention. 
Emotional regulation might have been more difficult 
for them than for participants in the other groups be-
cause – unlike the other conditions – they did not re-
ceive any advice on how to control their amusement 
properly. In fact, a situation that both amuses us and 
forbids us from showing our amusement makes it 
particularly funny (e.g., Robins & Vandree, 2009). So, 
we can suppose that participants from the control 
group had a  tougher task than those in the inhibi-
tion group. Having received an instruction to sup-
press amusement might have eased the task for the 
inhibition group, who had a  certain exercise to do. 
By contrast, participants in the control group were in 
a much more natural situation. They were watching 
humorous stimuli surrounded by other people, who 
they should not have interrupted for the sake of the 
‘dignity’ of a  scientific experiment. The inhibition 
group had in mind that the necessity to suppress re-
actions related to amusement had arisen from the in-
struction, not from the situation itself; therefore they 
could not have experienced an increased feeling of 
amusement because they did not attribute the sensa-
tion of effort (that stemmed from constant inhibition) 
to the humorous value of the stimuli. This may be 
why the inhibition group gave lower funniness rat-
ings to the pictures than the control group. All in all, 
participants from both the control and the inhibition 
group had to put effort into controlling their emo-
tional reaction, which led to worse performance in 
Task 2. Participants in the cognitive change group, 
thanks to the analysing strategy, might have seen the 
task as less effortful than the other groups, which re-
sulted in better performance in the SST.
The results revealed that the self-control trait had 
a  moderating impact on SST performance. There 
were no differences in SST performance between 
the groups if weak self-controllers are considered 
(–1 SD below the mean). However, increasing levels 
of the self-control trait displayed differences in SST 
performance, depending on the condition. For me-
dium level self-controllers, we observed a difference 
in favour of the latter between the inhibition group 
and the cognitive change group. This difference dis-
appeared for good self-controllers: participants from 
the inhibition group performed as well as in Task 2 as 
those from the cognitive change group if their level 
of self-control trait was relatively high (+1 SD above 
the mean). Still, both experimental groups outper-
formed the control group in the case of good self-
controllers. Individual differences in the self-control 
trait are possibly related to disparate strategies of 
coping (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007). In the inhibition 
group, participants with weaker self-control could 
regulate emotions that had already occurred; hence 
they had to put more effort into inhibiting all signs 
of ongoing emotion. In contrast, participants with 
stronger self-control could have deduced from the 
instruction that they would have to manage their 
emotions picture by picture and therefore might have 
more or less automatically implemented the guard-
ing strategy (like the cognitive change approach) to 
complete the task. This notion is consistent with the 
two-stage model of self-control proposed by Myrseth 
and Fishbach (2009), which propounds that effective 
self-control depends on knowing both when to exert 
control (detecting conflict) and what to exert (a good 
strategy). This hypothetical tendency would explain 
the similarity in SST performance between good 
self-controllers in the inhibition group and good self-
controllers in the cognitive change group. The basic 
conclusion may be that people with high self-control 
might have developed, and automatized through 
experience, better strategies to deal with manifold 
situations that require coping with emotions and im-
pulsive behaviour (Duckworth et al., 2016; Hofmann, 
Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012).
The suggested inference requires taking into con-
sideration the reason that the self-control trait did 
not protect participants in the control group (we 
suggested previously that the control group might 
have had somewhat similar conditions as the inhibi-
tion group), which was previously believed to render 
similar conditions as the inhibition group. It seems 
crucial that, according to the instruction, participants 
in the control group did not have to (or even were 
not allowed to) regulate their emotions systemati-
cally. They could only spontaneously remark that it 
would be better to suppress the external symptoms 
of amusement so that they did not disturb other par-
ticipants in the lab. The instruction informed them 
that they would see pictures that had various levels 
of funniness; therefore, they should not have im-
plemented emotional regulation before the emotion 
occurred because it would have made them unable 
to properly rate the stimuli. It is also worth noting 
that the strategy of cognitive change did not work for 
the very low self-controllers, who performed equally 
poorly in Task 2 regardless of the strategy. We pro-
pose two possible explanations for this result. One is 
that poor self-controllers need more than just a brief 
instruction to properly implement a cognitive change 
strategy, as they are not used to using such strategies 
in their everyday lives. Another explanation is that 
poor self-controllers have weak executive functions 
(EF; Hofmann et al., 2012), so they perform tasks re-
quiring EF engagement (here: SST) at a level at which 
it is not possible to improve it. We did not control for 
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participants’ executive functions capacity; therefore, 
we cannot unequivocally resolve this issue.
All in all, the present study partially replicated the 
results of previous research: it indicates that exert-
ing self-control in the first task worsens self-control 
performance in the following task (see: Baumeister 
& Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister & Vohs, 2007; Hag-
ger et al., 2010). The results highlight the importance 
of including trait self-control into analysis of the 
effect. At first glance, the results may contribute to 
both the resource and the motivational explanations 
of self-control. However, it should be noted that 
what prevented the ego depletion effect was a good 
regulation strategy, not minimizing the amount of 
mental processes required by a  task; otherwise the 
results would be consistent with the resource model. 
Moreover, we can safely assume that critical analysis 
requires even more mental processes than inhibition 
of laughter, yet it may seem less effortful for people 
to reappraise the situation than to modulate ongoing 
emotions. Hopefully, simple suggestions that com-
prise good self-control strategies may help weaker 
(but not very weak) self-controllers to abstain from 
succumbing to temptations and enable them to act 
similarly to good self-controllers. This line of rea-
soning is consistent with Inzlicht et al.’s (2014) ex-
planation of the ego depletion effect. These authors 
emphasize that the state of ego depletion works 
through mental fatigue, which resembles an emo-
tion and leads to shifts in motivation and attention 
from obligations to rewards. In the case of labora-
tory experiments, a reward may simply boil down to 
the promise of free time, that is, finishing a tedious 
task (Inzlicht et al., 2014; Milyavskaya et al., 2015). 
This issue has been raised by Evans, Boggero, and 
Segerstrom (2016), who posit that if mental fatigue, 
similarly to emotions, has an informative function 
rather than being a consequence of ongoing physi-
ological changes and energy depletion, it would be 
prone to changes induced by emotion regulation 
strategies.
In considering the results of this study, we should 
emphasize its important limitations. Namely, the 
sample size was large enough to detect the predicted 
moderation (as it was tested to be sufficient to detect 
a medium effect size f = .30 based on a priori power 
analysis using G*Power software; the power analysis 
revealed that a sample of 90 participants was needed 
to obtain statistical power at the level 0.80), yet it 
was rather small, and further studies should increase 
the number of participants to replicate the results 
because the ego-depletion effect solely is sometimes 
reported as small (Hagger et al., 2010). Another limi-
tation pertains to the fact that our research tackles 
the problem of ego depletion only at the proximate 
level of explanation (Inzlicht et al., 2014), which per-
tains to the hypothetical processes responsible for 
worsening of performance in the second task. The 
ultimate explanation, on which we did not focus, 
may be phrased in the question ‘Why are there such 
limits?’ There are competing accounts on this issue 
also. In short, one conception propounds that peo-
ple are energetic misers and they (over)economize 
on their resources, thus they are very sensitive to 
every engagement in action (Evans et al., 2016). The 
opposite idea establishes the problem as an evolu-
tionary adaptation: humans had to develop a system 
which enabled them to maintain a balance between 
exploiting possessed rewards and exploring the 
environment for new opportunities (Inzlicht et  al., 
2014). Although our findings cannot give a  direct 
answer to the ultimate account, we believe they do 
contribute to the proximate account by taking into 
consideration the processual model of self-control 
and the moderating effects of the self-control trait. 
Given the above limitations, we believe that future 
studies would benefit from taking into considera-
tion the ultimate account by exploring the universal 
causes of the shifting motives to exert self-control. 
As for an individual differences perspective on self-
control research, it will be also of great importance 
to include in further studies the measurement of the 
trait self-control while manipulating other factors 
that may possibly render motivation shift effects 
(possible manipulations to explore: e.g. varying fi-
nancial incentives for performance; the difficulty of 
tasks; implementation of other regulatory strategies 
such as mindfulness-based or attentional-deploy-
ment techniques). Taking into account participants’ 
trait self-control could reveal that some manipula-
tions work only among participants with (under)de-
veloped self-control abilities, and therefore provide 
a crucial insight into understanding of the nature of 
self-control and also give a compelling background 
for practical interventions.
All in all, we hope that our results shed light on 
understanding the relationship between the self-
control state and the self-control trait and their in-
terplay with self-control strategies. As Inzlicht and 
Schmeichel (2012) stated, it is valuable to integrate 
models of self-control so as to begin to develop a uni-
fied view of this crucial psychological construct.
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